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deserves the thanks of every lover of science and the encouragement of the community. At the same time we feel it our duty to caution students not to fall into some errors, which Mr. Eaton might have avoided by a little more previous study and careful examination of characteristic specimens. This little work will be found a convenient guide to mineralogists who travel in New England, as it contains numerous localities of simple minerals, and even where errors have been committed respecting rocks, the attention will be directed to the places where they are said to occur, which otherwise might be passed unnoticed.

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ART. XIII.—*Documens historiques et Reflexions sur le Gouvernement de la Hollande par Louis Bonaparte. Ex Roi de Hollande.* Paris, 3 vols. 8vo. 1820.

SINCE the Bonaparte family have been relieved from the task of governing the greater part of Europe, they have devoted their leisure to literary pursuits of different kinds. A number of publications has appeared, in the composition of which Napoleon is supposed to have had a more or less direct agency; and it is reported that he is preparing a complete account of his own life. Lucien has published one or more voluminous epics, and may be allowed to have placed himself in this way at least on a level with the celebrated Cottle. Our guest, the Count de Survilliers, has favoured the world with a moral tale; and the author of the work, which forms the subject of this article, produced, some years since, a sentimental romance, which appeared in the first edition under the title of *Mary, or the Pains of Love*, and in the second under the equally seducing one, of *Mary, or the Dutch Women*. The king of Westphalia is, we believe, the only one of these illustrious brothers who has made no contribution whatever to the stock of literature.

The work we are reviewing is a production of a different character from any of those which we have mentioned. If one may judge from the number of translations which have been made of it, few works have passed so soon into a circulation so extensive. Besides the English, Italian, and German translations, four separate ones have been made into the Dutch. It is a work of no high literary claims, and is merely

an unpretending account of the administration of Louis Bonaparte in Holland, preceded by a brief review of the previous incidents of his life, and including some notices of the origin of the Bonaparte family and of the early life of Napoleon. As there is no doubt of its genuineness, it is the most authentic document yet before the public with which we are acquainted, respecting these last subjects, and contains several new and interesting particulars. Nor is it altogether without its value in the part, which relates to the administration of its royal author. The history of the short lived kingdom of Holland, though not one of the most important episodes in the great political action of the last thirty years, is by no means destitute of interest; and the reign of Louis is in some points altogether unique among those of his brother vassal kings of the fashion and family of Bonaparte. He appears to have ascended the throne with unaffected reluctance, and under an influence on the part of his brother amounting to little less than absolute duress; and to have entered upon the office with a resolute determination not to be made the instrument of oppressing his subjects, to which he adhered with a firmness, from which nothing but absolute violence from the same quarter ever compelled him to recede, and to which he finally made a voluntary sacrifice of his title and dignity. He evinced perhaps some feebleness of mind and a kind of willing self-deception in imagining for a moment that he could carry this system into effect, and he would have shown more consistency and firmness had he persevered from the beginning at all hazards in refusing a post, which he must have known he should never be permitted to occupy, except in such a way as to accomplish the views of the power that placed him there. It may be, too, that he displayed at the last moment of his reign a want of cool and deliberate judgment in regard to the part he ought to act, and there are symptoms in his narrative of a hankering, subsequently to his abdication, after the throne which he had abandoned. But these are blemishes in an honourable and virtuous character. It is no trifling glory to form, as far as we are acquainted with the history of this period, an exception very rare, if not quite solitary, to the general meanness and depravity of crowned and titled personages. Louis was rewarded for it at the time by the sincere respect and warm affection of his subjects, and his name continues to be men-

tioned by them with expressions of the same sentiments. They were then satisfied and still are, that although they suffered much during his reign from political oppression, it was against the desires and efforts of their sovereign. We are inclined to think that these particular features in the government of Louis Bonaparte are not universally known; and he was therefore right in attempting to prevent any misconstruction of his character by placing it before the public in its true light and in an authentic way.

We are pleased with the tone both moral and literary in which the work is composed. The style is plain and unpretending, and the author, in treating a subject extremely delicate throughout, has manifested a singular discretion, and has abstained religiously from any details, which are in their nature scandalous, or which would have tended unnecessarily to call in question the characters of individuals. There was a continual temptation to adopt a different course, in the abundant materials at his disposition for gratifying the public hunger after anecdote and scandal. In this particular as in the principles of his administration, the author has sacrificed his temporary success to a sense of propriety and justice. We think we shall give pleasure to our readers, in laying before them some of the particulars of the life and government of Louis. There are interspersed in the work a number of letters before unpublished from Napoleon, which are among the few yet in print pretending to proceed from that quarter, whose genuineness can be depended on. We shall copy in the course of this article some of those which, from the style and contents, appear the most remarkable.

Louis repels with contempt the reproach of vulgar extraction that has been thrown upon his family, and maintains that they are of ancient and noble origin. He produces some documents to show that they proceeded from Tuscany and that the family enjoyed in that part of Italy a very distinguished reputation. He has in his possession a history of the sack of Rome written in the sixteenth century by Jacopo Bonaparte, with an appendix by another hand containing a highly flattering account of the greatness and nobility of the family.\* It appears, however, that the work remained in manuscript till a recent period, and that the appendix is also

\* We have had an opportunity of examining this curious MS. now in the possession of a gentleman of Boston.

of later date. It professes to be printed at Cologne in 1756. It is observed in the beginning of the appendix, that ‘the family of the Bonapartes, of the city of San Miniato, is one of the most celebrated families not only in that city but in all Tuscany. When the city was an independent state, this family was of the number which always occupied the principal offices. It was reckoned among the noblest and most powerful houses. According to the unanimous testimony of the historians of the time, it held the first rank in the wars between San Miniato and Florence. All, who are read in our history and are acquainted with our archives, know that this house enjoyed the highest distinction and was one of the principal families in Florence, so that we think it useless to allege any other proof.’ This repeated and anxious assertion of the illustrious origin of the family looks a little suspicious. The preface proceeds, however, to enumerate various individuals who held dignities and offices of different kinds; and refers to printed books and public inscriptions in evidence. Among the latter is the inscription on the tombstone of J. J. Mucio de Bonaparte in the church of St. Francis at San Miniato, erected by Nicolas de Bonaparte, clerk of the apostolical chamber in 1441. Mucio is here qualified with the addition of ‘the most distinguished man of his time and country;’ *Clarissimo suae ætatis et patriæ viro*. Another work in Italian entitled the *History of the Joyous Knights [cavulieri gaudenti] of our blessed Lady, the virgin Mary of Treviso*, contains a detailed account of the Bonaparte family, and purports to have been printed at Venice in 1787. From the first sentence in this account, it would seem that the original family name was Parte, Dalla Parte, and that they received from the opposite factions of the Guelfs and Ghibelines, which then distracted the country, the *sobriquets* of Good part and Bad part, Malaparte and Buonaparte, the latter of which they naturally preferred and adopted as a name. This at least we take to be the meaning of the following phrase in the account, the construction of which is a little obscure, and which is not translated or noticed by Louis in his remarks. *Nobilissima fu la prosapia ed antica dei dalla Parte in Trevigi, per le fazioni Guelfe e Ghibellini dette Malaparte e Bonaparte*. Nondiglio, one of this family, a man of learning and authority according to the account, was *podestat* of Parma as long ago as the year 1272, and after

leaving his office was created one of the Joyous Knights, an order it seems of great dignity, whose object it was to resist heresy and support the church. Nondiglio founded a hospital. His brother Bonsembiante was equally distinguished and passes for a saint. Peter Bonaparte, the son of Nondiglio, was also a great character, and liberated Treviso from the tyranny of the princes Caminesi, in consequence of which the family were presented by the city with the castle of St. Zeno, and the exclusive right of wearing arms within and without the walls. Louis relates that a memoir on the antiquities of the family was at one time presented to Napoleon, in which it was proved by extracts from the archives of various cities in Italy that the family were anciently lords of Treviso. Napoleon paid no attention to it but threw it in the fire, observing that he wished his nobility to date from himself, and to hold his titles only of the French people. This remark was more honorable to him than the silly passion he contracted in the latter part of his reign, for the parade and ceremony of the old court, and which it is well known he carried to a ridiculous excess. The court ladies gave him the title of Monsieur de l'Étiquette. Respecting the antiquity of the family, it is related by Louis, that when Napoleon was about to marry the archduchess Marie Louise, her father said to some one who remonstrated against an alliance with a military adventurer of low origin, that he would not have consented to the marriage, if he had not known that the family of Napoleon was as noble as his own. It was a singular piece of self deception, if the emperor Francis had satisfied himself that the antiquity, real or supposed, of the Bonaparte family, had any considerable weight in inducing him to consent to this alliance. The branch of this family, from which Napoleon descended, settled very anciently at Ajaccio in Corsica. Charles Bonaparte, his father, was a man of distinction in the island. He fought for its independence under Paoli, and after it was added to France, he frequently acted as the deputy of the nobility to the court of Louis XV. The mother was named Ramolini and was of the family of the Counts Colalto. The first of the name, that settled at Ajaccio, had married a daughter of the Doge of Genoa. At the time when Paoli gave up the island to the English, they abandoned it and settled near Toulon and afterwards at Marseilles. A class of writers, who conceive that they raise the character of their

own party, by ascribing every description of vice and degradation to the family and person of an individual who was able to rule them with a rod of iron for twenty years, have asserted that Madame Bonaparte and her daughter lived at Marseilles in a state of debauchery. Louis repels this calumny (which is repeated in the *Biographie des hommes vivans*) with success; observing that the family were necessarily at this time at the head of the society at Marseilles, Napoleon being then the first artillery officer at the siege of Toulon in the neighbourhood, and of course the second person in the army there. At the same time Joseph married the daughter of Mr. Clary, one of the first merchants of the place, one of whose sisters is now the queen of Sweden.

Louis received a military education and was attached at a very early age to the staff of his brother. He gives the following brief notice of the circumstances attending the first elevation of the latter to the rank of commander in chief. At the time in question Napoleon was a Brigadier General.

‘About this time a general promotion took place in the army. Napoleon was appointed commander in chief of the artillery of the army of the west against the Vendéans. He was highly offended at this change, and repaired to Paris to remonstrate against so crying an injustice. This was soon after the event of the first of Prairial, when the populace of Paris besieged the Convention and massacred its president Farrand. They went on not only to change the station of Napoleon, but even to remove him from the artillery, giving him a brigade of infantry. This alteration he took as an insult, and lived at Paris without public employment till the 18th Vendémiaire, about five months.

‘At that time all the soldiery and especially all the general officers were called to the defence of the Convention, when attacked by a great number of the Parisian populace. Napoleon received the second command; but the deputy who was the commander in chief depended entirely upon him for the necessary arrangements. In a few moments all the attacks were repulsed, the assemblages dispersed, and the new constitution and the directory were established. He then was appointed commander in chief of the army of the interior, and soon after of the army of Italy.’

Louis accompanied his brother in the first Italian campaign and afterwards in that of Egypt, the details of both of which he goes over in a cursory manner. Upon his brother’s re-

turn and elevation to the consulship, he was appointed colonel of a regiment of dragoons, and sent to serve in Normandy, where the troubles had not quite ceased. Peace soon followed in this quarter, but it was thought expedient that some of the rebel leaders should be brought to a court martial, and Louis was called upon to preside. This, however, he obstinately refused, nor could any threats or entreaties induce him to consent. He even protested against the judgment of death passed upon these persons, but without effect. His regiment was soon after recalled to Paris, and from this time he lost in a great degree the good will of his brother.

It appears, however, to have been a favourite object with his brother and with Josephine to effect a marriage between her daughter Hortensia de Beauharnois and Louis. The scandalous motives which have been assigned for this anxiety we shall not recapitulate, as they receive no countenance from the narrative of Louis, although he does not give them a direct contradiction. He was evidently in the highest degree averse to the connexion. The proposition was made to him soon after the return of Napoleon from the second campaign in Italy, and he then gave it a decided refusal, not as he says from any objection to the reputation or morals of the young lady who was liked by every body, but because he feared that their characters were not suited to each other. Not long after the proposition was renewed but with no better success, and to escape from further importunity on this point, Louis undertook a journey of several months in Germany. Upon his return from this expedition, he was assailed by a new repetition of the same proposal. An expedition was then organizing for Portugal, in which he contrived to have his regiment included, and thus obtained a new pretence to elude the importunities of his over kind connexions, who, like so many of the fathers and uncles in romance, were obstinately bent upon making him happy against his will. After his return from Portugal they returned with fresh spirits to the charge, and finally succeeded in obtaining his consent; which, however, could not have been given with a very good grace, if we may judge by the terms in which Louis describes the conclusion of the ceremony.

‘Immediately after his return, his sister-in-law spoke to him again of his marriage. He was invited to her house daily. Louisa



constantly refused his consent to this project, of which the execution seemed to him impossible. Notwithstanding this, one evening when there was a ball at Malmeson, his sister took him aside, his brother joined the conference, and after a very long conversation *they made him give his consent*, on lui fit donner son consentement. The day of the ceremony was fixed, and on the 4th January 1802, the contract, the civil marriage and the religious ceremony took place. Louis was married. *Never could a ceremony be more unpleasant* ; never could two persons feel a more lively presentiment of all the horrors of an unwilling and ill assorted union. From this his unhappiness, his bodily and mental sufferings take their date. There cannot be a misfortune more actual and direct than domestic unhappiness. 'This of Louis weighed on his spirit and produced throughout his life a deep sorrow, a feeling of discouragement, and a *drying of the heart*, if one may so say, which nothing ever did or could remedy.'

In 1804 he was appointed a brigadier general. He mentions the death of the Duc d'Enghien in strong terms of regret and horror, and declares that Napoleon was certainly drawn into the adoption of this measure in a hasty and perfidious manner.

We now arrive at the period when Louis was elevated to the throne of Holland. The first intimation he had of his brother's intentions in this respect was conveyed to him during the campaign of Austerlitz. At that time Louis commanded a corps of troops stationed in Holland, to protect the northern portion of the empire against a diversion on the part of Prussia, and his conduct was publicly praised by Napoleon. After the close of the campaign he sent back the greater part of his troops to Paris, and went himself to meet his brother at Strasburgh. He was received with coolness, and Napoleon intimated that he should have preferred to have had him remain in Holland, and retain military possession of it.

"Why have you left Holland?" said he to Louis ; "I wished you to be there, you ought to have staid there." "When peace was once concluded," returned the latter, "I endeavoured to repair the error, with which you reproached me in your letters, by sending back to their posts the troops which I had drawn from thence to form the army of the north. I acknowledge," added he, "that the reports which were circulating in Holland of me, and certain changes in the government of that country, hastened

my departure. These reports are of a nature to displease that free and estimable nation, and are also disagreeable to myself.” ’

The emperor gave him to understand that the report which had been in circulation was correct, and that he was to be created king of Holland. Louis gave himself but little trouble about it and thought that he should escape without difficulty from the honour intended him, and of which he was not ambitious. One would suppose that his previous experience in the article of matrimony, might have instructed him a little better, and the result soon proved that he had flattered himself with escaping from being a king, too soon and to little purpose. Five months after, in the spring of 1806, there arrived at Paris from Holland a deputation of five ambassadors, men of high rank and consequence, to negotiate upon the affairs of their country. Couriers were despatched, instructions were demanded, and notes were exchanged; and in four months a treaty was concluded, by which the republic of the United Provinces was transformed into the constitutional monarchy of Holland.

During these negotiations Louis received no official intimation that his personal interest was at all connected with them. At last the ambassadors informed him privately what was going on, and assured him that the nation gave him the preference for king. He began now to take his measures for avoiding the place, but still Napoleon did not condescend to hold any communication with him on the subject, and made him an insulting and evasive answer, equivalent to the coarse vernacular proverb, that he need not be frightened before he was hurt. Every thing being at last arranged, the emperor informed him that he was to be king of Holland, and that if he had not been hitherto consulted, it was because the duty of a subject was to obey: a singular reason for treating a sovereign elect in this manner. Louis still held back; but little account however was taken of his objections, attributed perhaps to feigned or real modesty. Prince Talleyrand shortly after made him a visit at St. Leu, and read the treaty and constitution to him and his wife the future queen. This was the first official knowledge they had of these papers. He was asked whether he approved them. He replied that not having been in the secret of these negotiations, it was impossible to form any opinion on so important a subject. He would endeavour to do his best. He was then informed that the third

day after, he would be proclaimed king of Holland. When the day arrived, he received an invitation in the ordinary form to go to St. Cloud. An ambassador from Turkey with presents was to be presented the same day, and after this business had been first dispatched, an audience was allowed to the deputies of Holland, who requested in a formal speech that his majesty's brother, prince Louis, might be granted them for king. The emperor very graciously consented to their request, and the ceremony concluded with a speech from the new monarch.

Such was the game of high life below stairs habitually played by this great disposer of crowns and sceptres. It is difficult to say, whether this cold-hearted contempt for the feelings of his nearest connexions, displayed greater want of humanity or policy. His mother said of Napoleon that his heart was as hard and as cold as a cannon ball, and the unnecessary and wanton affronts which he thus took occasion to heap upon poor Louis, at the moment when it came within the 'scope of his policy' to make him a king, are a good proof of the remark. There is also a strange incoherence, producing an effect which borders very nearly on the ludicrous, between the lofty and splendid images which we are accustomed to associate with the royal name and office, and the series of degradations and humiliations which we see here connected with the assumption of it. We should perhaps be less struck with this contrast, if the secret histories of ancient and *legitimate* courts were more generally known. It would probably be found for the most part a tissue of frivolity and vice. But something better might have been reasonably expected from a ruler elevated by the force of his own character, and placed in a sort of opposition to the vices and follies of the old governments. The consciousness of talent seems, however, only to have encouraged him to practise the same corruptions with greater audacity. We are afraid, after all, that the possession of unlimited power, whether by inheritance or acquisition, corrupts at once both the heart and the judgment, and that the best if not the only chance a nation can have of an administration upon tolerably correct principles, is to put the effective power into the hands of plain, elected, responsible magistrates.

We shall not follow the new king through the details of his internal administration. The finances of the country were

in a desperate state at the time of his arrival, and all commerce was cut off excepting the contraband trade. Louis appears to have connived at this traffic, which perhaps was necessary to the very existence of so commercial a people as the Dutch. In this way he gave mortal offence to his brother, who lost no time in displaying his ill humour in various ways. Among other unpleasant circumstances attending his position, Louis was subjected to the inconvenience of seeing himself occasionally represented in newspaper articles and public documents, as saying things which he not only never thought of, but which were directly contrary to his views. Thus in the attempt made to open a negotiation by Lord Lauderdale in 1806, the French government remarked, in their answer to the English minister's first note, that 'Prince Louis, when he accepted the crown of Holland, *formally declared* his intention to renounce it, if the Dutch colonies were not restored at a general peace.' 'Not only,' says the present work, in which the third person is used habitually in speaking of Louis, 'not only had Louis never made any such formal declaration of his sentiments, but he had heard nothing of the matter till he saw the note in the newspapers.' This rhetorical artifice, intended to increase the effect of certain remarks which he wished to make, was frequently practised by Napoleon. The unfortunate Marshal Ney was surprized one morning to see in the *Moniteur* a letter bearing his signature, with which he was entirely unacquainted, and Napoleon at the audience perhaps did not increase his satisfaction by saying to him in a good natured way, 'I have made you talk for the first time, my dear marshal, like a man of sense.' *Je vous ai fait faire de l'esprit.* Though a man of acknowledged bravery, the marshal's reputation for wit was not very high.

At the close of the year 1806 the famous Berlin decree was enacted, which prohibited all commerce with England, and Louis was required to enforce it in Holland. He could not absolutely refuse to take some analogous measures, but would not consent to re-enact the decree, and upon the whole he failed to give satisfaction. He was soon after called upon to sequester all English property in Holland. This he declined; and a proposition to seize the property of the Prince of Orange, now king of the Netherlands, in the public stocks, met with a similar fate. Great complaints were made of the contraband traffic, to which Louis coolly replied,

that you might as well attempt to prohibit the perspiration of the skin, as to interdict all commerce in a country situated like the Netherlands ; *Empêche donc*, said he, *la peau de transpirer*. At another time he was standing on one of the quays, with some of his French courtiers about him, whose real function was probably that of spies for Napoleon, when they saw a Swedish and an American vessel coming up with their respective flags flying, Sweden being at that time on bad terms with France. The circumstance was mentioned to Louis by one of his attendants, but he coldly replied, that he saw nothing but a merchant ship, and turned his back upon the officious informer. The existence of this system of administration could not fail to be discovered and resented by the French government. After the conquest of Prussia in the year 1806, Louis sent a deputation to Berlin to congratulate him upon his achievement. The emperor, elated with these prodigious successes, was not disposed to pay great attention to the conscientious scruples of his brother, or to stand much upon ceremony in telling him so. Instead of giving the deputation a gracious reception and thanking them for their compliment, he loaded them and their master with the grossest outrages and insults. Louis was cruelly astonished at this return for all the good he had been doing in Holland for the six months past, and ascribes it to his brother's ill humour at the little success of the continental system in that country. He adds, however, that he thought it his duty to pay no attention to his threats or discontent. He had adopted as his favourite sentiment the Dutch maxim, *Doe wel en zie niet om*, *Do your duty without regard to consequences*. About this time he instituted an order of knighthood, called the Order of Union, of which the above phrase was the device.

The dissatisfaction of Napoleon began pretty soon to display itself in something more substantial than threats and insults, and in the course of the year 1807 he compelled Louis to conclude a treaty of cession of some considerable provinces, including the city of Flushing. A still more extensive cession had been hinted at, by the French ambassador, M. de la Rochefoucault, comprehending the greatest part of Brabant and Zealand, which Louis rejected with some expressions of humour. He afterwards wrote a letter to Napoleon on the subject, and received the following answer, which affords a good specimen of the imperial epistolary style.

We subjoin the original of this letter, as a specimen of the imperial author's manner.\*

‘My brother, I received your letter relative to the overture which was made by M. de la Rochefoucault. He was authorized only to make it indirectly. Since this change is unpleasant to you, it shall be thought of no more. It was useless to make me this *étalage* of principles, since I never said that you ought not consult the nation. Intelligent Hollanders had given to understand that it would be indifferent to Holland to lose Brabant, full of fortified places, which cost a great deal, and which has more affinity with France than Holland, in exchange for the provinces of the north, rich and convenient to you. But again, since this arrangement is unpleasant to you, there is an end of it. There was no necessity even for speaking to me of it, since M. de la Rochefoucault was directed only to sound you on the affair.’

About this time Napoleon was making his arrangements to take possession of Spain, and conceived the idea of transferring Louis to the throne of that country. He probably thought that his conscientious character would be less immediately inconvenient in Spain, and that having removed him from Holland, he could make any disposition of it he thought proper. He accordingly addressed a letter to Louis, as early as March 27, 1808, proposing this plan, intimating, among other reasons, that *the climate of Holland was not good for his health*: a manner of treating the subject which seems to have displeased Louis very much. He observes that the proposition struck him with surprise and indignation. He was on terms of friendship with Charles IV of Spain, so that the whole measure appeared both impolitic and unjust; and he also regarded himself as bound by his oath to Holland. He did not like the idea that his brother should treat him as a prefect or governor, whom he could transfer at pleasure from

\* ‘Mon frère, je reçois votre lettre relative à l’ouverture qu’a faite le sieur de la Rochefoucauld. Il n’a été autorisé qu’à la faire indirectement. Puisque cet échange ne vous plaît pas, il n’y faut plus penser. *Il était inutile de me faire un étalage de principes*, puisque je n’ai jamais dit que vous ne deviez pas consulter la nation. Des Hollandais instruits avaient fait connoître, qu’il serait indifférent à la Hollande de perdre le Brabant, semé de places fortes, qui coûtent beaucoup, qui a plus d’affinité avec la France qu’avec la Hollande, en l’échangeant contre des provinces du nord, riches et à votre convenance. Encore une fois, puisque cet arrangement ne vous convient pas, c’est une affaire finie. Il était inutile même de m’en parler, puisque le sieur la Rochefoucauld n’a eu ordre que de sonder le terrain.’

one province to another. Louis would perhaps have done well to recollect, that, looking at the matter in a cool and dispassionate point of view, he could not possibly regard himself in any other light, and that his only choice was between renouncing his throne at once, or holding it as a lieutenant of Napoleon, and an agent in his service. His system of administration throughout is, as we have observed, more remarkable for good feeling, than good judgment. He refused, however, categorically the exchange proposed, and the crown of Spain was given to Joseph, who did not feel the same scruples about abandoning Naples. The following is the letter of Napoleon above mentioned.\*

‘My brother, the king of Spain has just abdicated. The Prince of Peace has been thrown into prison. An insurrection has broken out at Madrid. In this juncture my troops were 40 leagues from Madrid; the grand duke de Berg was to enter it on the 24th with 40,000 men. Up to this hour the people loudly call for me. Certain that I shall never have a solid peace with England, except by giving a great movement to the continent, I have resolved to place a French prince on the throne of Spain. *The climate of Holland does not agree with you.* Besides, Holland cannot arise from its ruins. In this whirlwind of the world she cannot support herself, whether peace take place or not. In this situation of things, I think of you for the throne of Spain. You will be the sovereign of a generous nation of eleven millions of men, and with important colonies. With economy and vigour, Spain can have sixty thousand men under arms, and fifty vessels in her ports. Answer me categorically, what is your opinion on this project. You see this is yet nothing but a project, and, though I have a hundred thousand men in Spain, it is possible, by the circumstances which may occur, either that I march directly, and every thing be done in fifteen days, or that I proceed more slowly, and that this should be the secret of many months of operations. Answer me categorically, *If I name you king of Spain, will you accept the throne? Can I depend upon you?* As it is possible, that your courier may not find me at Paris, and that therefore he will have to pass through Spain in the midst of accidents, which cannot be anticipated, answer me only these two words: “I have received your letter of such a date, I answer *yes*,” and then I shall depend on your doing what I wish: or otherwise *no*, which will tell me that you do not accept my proposition. You can after-

\* ‘Mon frère, le roi d’Espagne vient d’abdiquer. Le Prince de la Paix a été mis en prison. Un commencement d’insurrection a éclaté à Madrid.

wards write a letter, and develop your ideas in detail, in regard to your wishes ; and address it under cover to your wife at Paris. If I am there, she will send it to me ; if not, she will return it.

‘ Do not admit any person to your confidence, nor speak to any one whomsoever, I beg you, on the subject of this letter, for a thing ought to be done, before one is willing to own that he has thought of it,’ &c.

Finding that Louis could not be prevailed upon to enforce the continental system, Napoleon, in September 1808, prohibited the entry of colonial produce into the empire from Holland, a measure which induced Louis to publish a decree, enforcing the system a little more strongly ; after which the prohibition was repealed. The feelings of Louis at this time toward his brother are well illustrated by an anecdote he relates of a conversation with Prince Dolgoruky, the Russian

Dans cette circonstance, mes troupes étaient éloignées de 40 lieues de Madrid ; le Grand Duc de Berg a dû y entrer le 24 avec quarante mille hommes. Jusqu’à cette heure le peuple m’appelle à grands cris. Certain que je n’aurai de paix solide avec l’Angleterre, qu’en donnant un grand mouvement au continent, j’ai résolu de mettre un prince Français sur le trône d’Espagne. *Le climate de Hollande ne vous convient pas.* D’ailleurs la Hollande ne saurait sortir de ses ruines. Dans le tourbillon du monde, que la paix ait lieu ou non, il n’y a pas de moyen pour qu’elle se soutienne. Dans cette situation des choses, je pense à vous pour le trône d’Espagne. Vous serez souverain d’une nation généreuse, de onze millions d’hommes, et de colonies importantes. Avec de l’économie et de l’activité, l’Espagne peut avoir soixante mille hommes sous les armes, et cinquante vaisseaux dans ses ports. Répondez-moi catégoriquement quelle est votre opinion sur ce projet. Vous sentez que ceci n’est encore qu’un projet, et que, quoique j’aie cent mille hommes en Espagne, il est possible, par les circonstances qui peuvent survenir, ou que je marche directement, et que tout soit fait dans quinze jours ; ou que je marche plus lentement, et que cela soit le secret de plusieurs mois d’opérations. Répondez-moi catégoriquement : *Si je vous nomme roi d’Espagne, l’agréez-vous ? Puis-je compter sur vous ?* Comme il serait possible que votre courrier ne me trouvât plus à Paris, et qu’alors il faudrait qu’il traversât l’Espagne au milieu des chances que l’on ne peut prévoir ; répondez-moi seulement ces deux mots : J’ai reçu votre lettre de tel jour, je réponds *oui*, et alors je compterai que vous ferez ce que je voudrai : ou bien *non*, ce qui voudra dire que vous n’agréez pas ma proposition. Vous pourrez ensuite écrire une lettre où vous développerez vos idées en détail sur ce que vous voulez, et vous l’adresserez sous l’enveloppe de votre femme à Paris. Si j’y suis, elle me la remettra ; si non, elle vous la renverra.

‘ Ne mettez personne dans votre confidence, et ne parlez, je vous prie, à qui que ce soit de l’objet de cette lettre ; car il faut qu’une chose soit faite, pour qu’on avoue d’y avoir pensé etc.’



ambassador, on the possibility of enforcing a prohibition of commerce in Holland. ‘We live on hope,’ said Louis, ‘and by expedients, as Providence permits,’ *comme le ciel le permet*. The ambassador, in allusion to the word *Providence*, and wishing to ascertain whether the king had authorized any secret relaxation of his prohibitory measures, quoted with a smile the following line from one of the French poets: *ah! sire*, said he,

‘*Il est avec le Ciel des accommodemens.*’

*Oui, monsieur*, says Louis, *mais il n’en est point avec l’Enfer*, and changed the conversation.

The relations between Holland and France continued in this uncertain and unfriendly state, till towards the close of the year 1809. In the summer of that year the British made a descent upon the island of Walcheren in Zealand, which turned out more unfortunately than almost any expedition of the war. One of its effects was to hasten the crisis of affairs in Holland. A French army had been collected in the bordering provinces of the two countries to repel the British, and, after the latter had disappeared, it was thought prudent by Napoleon to improve this opportunity for executing the project of union, which he had for some time been meditating. The French troops accordingly began to march into Brabant and Zealand. Under these circumstances it was necessary for Louis to come to some decisive resolution with regard to his own conduct. He seems to have inclined to the idea of concluding an alliance at once with England, and opposing by force the Emperor’s aggressions. This determination, however magnanimous and spirited, would have been evidently desperate and disastrous to the country. It is true that the Dutch had succeeded a century before by cutting the dikes, in opposing a temporary resistance to Louis XIV, until the coalition of the powers of Europe could come to their aid. At present nothing could be hoped from the continental states, who had all been crippled in the campaign of 1809, nor after the expedition of Walcheren had just ended as it did, could much assistance be looked for from England. Indeed the European powers probably considered the fate of Holland as decided when it was placed under the government of Louis, and would hardly have thought it worth while to engage in a war to prevent a union from taking place, which already

existed in substance. Such were the ideas of the ministry in Holland, and Louis was advised not to attempt an open resistance, but to endeavour, by making his brother a visit at Paris, to conciliate his good will, and change his determinations. These had already been announced by the Emperor without much disguise. After concluding at Schoenbrunn, the treaty of 1809, he was heard to say to his officers : *we have finished our work here ; we have nothing to do now but to march against Spain, and especially against Holland.* Louis arrived at Paris the first of December of the same year.

He had but little reason however to be satisfied with the success of his journey. If he had been treated with coldness and contempt at the time of his appointment to the crown, he was now made the object of outrage and almost of personal violence. He was placed under guard in his house, and constituted virtually a state prisoner. Advantage, however, was taken of his presence to make an overture to the British ministry for the revocation of the orders in council ; a private agent, M. Labouchère, of the house of Hope & Co. of Amsterdam was despatched to sound Lord Wellesley, ostensibly as from the government of Holland, and to let him know, that if the orders were not repealed, Holland would certainly be united to the French empire. The British government, considering their decrees as retaliatory upon France, and not being willing to take the first steps in a common repeal, declined the overture. Every effort was now employed by Louis to prevent the union, although it is rather difficult to imagine what advantage he could expect by protracting a little longer a state of embarrassment, which could not well be expected to have any other conclusion, considering the absolute inconsistency of the objects of Napoleon in placing him in Holland, and the principles of government he had adopted. In answer to a letter demanding an explanation of the Emperor's views upon Holland, the following reply was made by Napoleon.

‘ Sir, my brother, I received the letter of *your majesty*. You wish I should give you to know my intentions with respect to Holland. When your majesty mounted the throne of Holland, a part of the Dutch nation desired a union with France. The esteem, which I had been taught by history to feel for that brave nation, led me to desire that it should preserve its name and its independence. I drew up a constitution myself, which was to be the base of your majesty's throne, and I placed you on it. I hop-

ed that, educated near myself, you would have had that attachment to France which she has a right to expect from her children, and still more from her princes. I hoped, that educated in my policy, you would have felt that Holland, conquered by my people, owed its independence solely to their generosity; that Holland, weak, without alliance, and without army, would and should be conquered the day she opposed herself directly to France; that you had no right to separate your policy from mine, and that finally, Holland was bound by treaties with me. I hoped, that in placing on the throne of Holland a prince of my own blood, I had discovered the *mezzo termine*, which would conciliate the interests of the two states, and unite them in a common interest and a common hatred to England, and I was confident I had benefited Holland, as by my act of mediation I had Switzerland. But I soon found that I had amused myself by a vain illusion; my hopes were deceived. Your majesty, on mounting the throne of Holland, forgot you were a Frenchman, and you have tried all the resources of your reason, and tormented the delicacy of your conscience to persuade yourself that you belonged to Holland. The Dutch citizens who inclined most to France were neglected and persecuted, those who served the interests of England were advanced. Frenchmen of all ranks have been expelled or degraded, and I have had the grief of seeing in Holland, under a prince of my blood, the French name exposed to disgrace. But I carry so deeply in my heart, and have been able to bear so high on the bayonets of my soldiers the reputation and honour of the French name, that it does not belong to Holland, or any one else, to slander it with impunity. The speeches of your majesty to the nation have been distinguished by a disaffected disposition. There is seen there nothing but allusions to France, and instead of giving the example of an oblivion of the past, they recall it constantly, and thus flatter the secret passions and feelings of the enemies of my government. But what do these Hollanders complain of? are they not conquered by our arms? do they not owe their independence to the generosity of my people? ought they not to bless the generosity of France, which has constantly left open their canals and customhouses, which has employed its conquest only to protect them, and even to this hour has used its power only in consolidating their independence. Who then can justify the conduct of your majesty, insulting to the nation and offensive to myself. *You are to understand that I do not separate myself from my predecessors, and that from Clovis to the committee of public safety I regard myself as the responsible representative of the whole, and that the ill which is fondly said of the governments which have preceded me, I take as said in the intention of insulting*

myself. I know that it has become customary with some to eulogize me and decry France ; but those who do not love France do not love me ; those who speak ill of my people are my greatest enemies. If I had no other reason of discontent than the sight of the disgrace, into which the French name had fallen in Holland, the right of sovereignty permitted me to declare war against a prince, my neighbour, in whose dominions such insults were permitted against my people. But from this I have refrained.

But your majesty is mistaken in my character ; you have a false idea of my kindness and of my sentiments towards you. You have violated all the treaties you have made with me. You have dismantled your fleets, disbanded your sailors, and broken up your armies, till Holland is without forces on land or at sea ; as if warehouses, merchants, and committees could consolidate a nation. These make a rich association, but the royal power cannot exist without finances, without a regular system of recruiting, and without a fleet.

‘ Your majesty has done more. You profited of the moment, when I was embarrassed on the continent, to renew the relations of Holland with England, and to violate the blockade-laws, the only successful means of annoying her. I showed my discontent with this conduct, by laying an interdiction with France, and I caused her to feel that even without the assistance of my armies, by closing the Rhine, the Weser, the Scheldt, and the Meuse against Holland, I could place her in a more critical situation than if I had declared war against her, and that I could insulate her to a ruinous degree.

‘ This blow was felt in Holland. Your majesty implored me to be generous, appealed to my fraternal sentiments, and promised a change of conduct. I thought this would be sufficient warning. I took off the interdiction of my customhouses, but your majesty soon returned to your former system. It is true that I was then at Vienna, and had a heavy war on my hands. *All the American vessels which, on being driven from the ports of France, offered themselves at those of Holland, were admitted by your majesty.* I was obliged a second time to shut my customhouses against the Dutch intercourse. Certainly it was difficult to make a more authentic declaration of war. In this state of things we may be considered as actually at war. In my speech to the corps legislatif I gave them to understand my discontent, and I shall not conceal from you, that it is my intention to unite Holland to France as a complement of the territory, as the most fatal blow I can inflict on England, and as freeing me from the continual insults which the leaders of your cabinet are constantly offering me. In fact, the mouths of the Rhine and the Meuse

ought to belong to me. The principle that the channel [talweg] of the Rhine is our boundary is a fundamental principle. Your majesty wrote me, in your letter of the 17th, that you are sure of being able to destroy all commerce of Holland with England; that you can raise finances, armies, and navies; that you will establish the principles of the constitution in giving no privileges to the nobility, in abolishing the marshals, *which is but a caricature*, and which is incompatible with a power of the second rank; in fine, that you would *seize* all the depositories of colonial merchandize, and *all that has arrived in American vessels, which ought not to have entered your ports*. It is my opinion that your majesty has promised more than you can perform, and that the union of Holland with France is but deferred. I allow that I have no more interest to unite the territories on the right bank of the Rhine to France, than I have to unite to it the grand duchy of Berg and the Hanseatic towns. I then can leave Holland all the territory on the right bank of the Rhine, and I will repeal my acts of nonintercourse whenever the treaties already existing, and which shall be renewed, shall be executed. The following are my intentions, with respect to

‘ 1. Interdiction of all commerce and intercourse with England.

‘ 2. A navy of 14 ships of the line, 7 frigates, and 7 brigs or corvettes, armed and equipped.

‘ 3. A land force of 25,000.

‘ 4. The suppression of the order of marshals.

‘ 5. The abolition of the privileges of the nobility, contrary to the constitution which I gave and guarantied.

‘ Your majesty can negotiate with the Duc de Cadore, by interposition of your minister; but you may rest assured that at the first packet-boat, the first vessel which shall enter Holland, I will re-establish the non-intercourse, and that at *the first insult, which is offered to my flag, I will cause to be seized by force and hung at the yard-arm, the Dutch officer who dares to insult my eagle*. Your majesty will find in me a brother, if I find a Frenchman in you; but if you forget the sentiments which attach you to our common country, you will not complain if I forget those of the relations which nature has placed between us. In fine, the union of Holland and France will be of the utmost utility to France, Holland, and the continent, *for it will cause the utmost annoyance to England*. This union may take place either peaceably or forcibly. I am sufficiently aggrieved by Holland to declare war. Notwithstanding this, I shall be ready to agree to an arrangement which shall cede me the boundary of the Rhine, and by which Holland shall engage to fulfil the conditions stipulated above.

‘ Your affectionate brother.

[Signed]

‘ NAPOLEON.

‘ *At Trianon, Dec. 21, 1809.*’

A treaty was at length concluded upon the basis of the proposition contained in this letter, and signed March 16th, 1810. It provides for the introduction of a body of French troops into Holland, to cooperate with the Dutch troops in enforcing the continental system. The following is also in the number of the articles.

10. All merchandise brought by American vessels, which have arrived in the ports of Holland since the first of January 1809, shall be sequestered and shall belong to France, to be disposed of according to circumstances and her political relations with the United States.

By virtue of this article, a large amount of American property was subsequently delivered to the French government, and thus lost to the owners. We understand that an attempt has been made by our government to obtain satisfaction for their loss from the present government of the Netherlands, as responsible for the acts of the nation under a former government, but without effect.

By this treaty a great part of the Dutch provinces south of the Rhine was ceded to France, and Napoleon soon after made a visit to his newly acquired country. His troops were at the same time introduced into the remaining provinces, and as Louis did not exhibit all the good humour under this operation that might perhaps have been politic, it soon became pretty evident that Napoleon intended to execute his original plan, and to unite the whole country to France. Louis seems to have intended, in submitting to the humiliating conditions that had been imposed upon him, to put Napoleon as much as possible in the wrong, that he might in the end appeal with greater advantage to the spirit of the people, for the purpose of making an active resistance. When at last the French commandant was about to place a garrison in Amsterdam under the king's eyes, he thought the decisive moment had arrived. His own resolution was to cut the dikes, to place the country in a posture of defence, and resist, if necessary, to the last drop of blood. Upon communicating this plan to his principal advisers, military and civil, he was astonished to learn that nobody agreed with him in opinion. Finding the crisis at hand, several of the more considerable among them had obtained leave of absence from court, in order to recruit their health at the watering places. The rest strongly dissuaded him from desperate measures.

Seeing that he was alone in his opinion, he finally determined to abdicate in favour of his son, and this resolution was carried into effect the first of July. Louis intended by this measure to deprive Napoleon of his pretext for uniting the country to France ; but the emperor was not a man to be cheated in this way of his prey. It was always his maxim, as he says in one of his letters to Louis, to come directly to the point. The act of abdication was pronounced to be a nullity, and the country was formally united a few weeks after to the French empire.

Thus ended the tragi-comedy of the administration of king Louis in Holland. If it was chimerical to think of resisting, by force, the will of Napoleon, before his visit to Paris, and while Holland was still clear of foreign troops, it would have been little better than madness to undertake it at a time when the French forces already garrisoned all the towns. The ministers of Louis seem to have viewed the state of things throughout, with a much sounder and more correct judgment than the king ; and in fact if the inhabitants of Holland had found themselves unable to defend their liberty and independence against foreign influence, but had been for thirty years the almost unresisting prey of every conqueror, how could it be expected that they would be suddenly inspired with such a desperate resolution, from regard for the interests or rights of a stranger, whose presence in the country was itself a sufficient proof of their incapacity to make any effectual head, against a powerful invader ?

Louis retired, after his abdication, first into Austria, and afterwards into Switzerland. Some attempts were made by the French government to induce him to return to France, and M. de Cazes, who has since acted so conspicuous a part in France, but who was then private secretary to Madame Mère, and had lately held the same post under Louis, was twice despatched to make him some overtures to this effect, which Louis declined. He also made a formal protestation against the union of Holland to France in an official document, which he privately delivered soon after to the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and which is now published ; and he subsequently declined, in a public manner, the provision made for him and his family by the French government, as well as the allowances stipulated in their favour at Fontainebleau, at the time of the Emperor's abdication. These official papers are sufficiently interesting, but too long to be extracted.

Upon the Emperor's first reverse in Russia, Louis made some attempts to avail himself of the new state of things, to recover the possession of his lost crown. For this purpose he addressed to Napoleon the following letter, and received the answer annexed.

‘Deeply afflicted by the sufferings and losses of the grand army, after successes which have carried the French arms to the pole, being able to judge easily how you must be occupied, how urgent the necessity is of uniting all the possible means of defence at the moment, in fine, when a terrible struggle is to be continued and to become still more furious, convinced that there never was a more critical moment for France, for your fame, and for yourself, I should feel myself deficient in the discharge of every duty, if I did not yield to the strong impulse of my heart. I wish then, Sire, to offer to the land of my birth, to yourself, and to my name, the little health which remains to me, and all the services of which I am capable, if I can but have an honorable justification for doing it.

‘Sire, I belong to Holland, to whom you gave me in spite of myself. I did not quit my kingdom, till after having struggled with my situation as long as it was morally possible for a Frenchman and your brother to do so.

‘At present the affairs of Holland and commerce are of secondary importance; it is possible that it is your intention to recall to you your brother, and that it will be important to secure Holland by it. In this event, deign to reestablish a kingdom which was your own work, and I am ready to aid France and your majesty by every effort, in the great struggle, which is undoubtedly about to continue more fiercely than ever. If such should be your intention, I ask of you only a public act, which shall give to be understood what has been and what is to be my situation.

‘I know, Sire, that my efforts and resources are of little value, but I can offer no more.

‘Whatever may have been thought of me, Sire, I have never been, nor ever could be, insensible, and a stranger to my name, to my mother, to my son.

‘Whatever may be your determination and the course of events, may your majesty think of all the privations, the temptations, the solitude, the illness, &c. which I have resisted sooner than to have recourse to extremities, and be perfectly convinced that there are in me, as in the heart of every honest man, sentiments and principles which nothing can destroy.’



To this letter Napoleon made the following reply.\*

‘ *Paris, January 16, 1813.*

‘ My brother, I received your letter of the 1st January, and observe with pleasure the sentiments which animate you. I have already given you to understand that your duty towards me, your country, and your children, exacted your return to France. Return then without delay, and I will receive you, not as a brother whom you have offended, but as a father who educated you. As to the ideas you have of the situation of my affairs, they are false. I have a million of men on foot, and two hundred millions in my coffers to maintain the integrity of the territory of the confederation, and of that of my allies, and to procure the success of the project I have conceived for the happiness of my people. *Holland is French forever, she is the emanation of our territory*, the embouchure of our rivers. She could not be happy but with France, and she feels it well. By remaining in France you will not separate yourself from Holland. If, by separating yourself from it, you mean ceasing to govern it, it was yourself that quitted it by your abdication,’ &c.

After the battle of Leipsic, Louis made a new attempt of the same kind, and even thought of returning to Holland by way of France, provided his brother should agree to it. When he arrived at Paris he was quite astonished to find, that instead of accepting his proposal, Napoleon would not even allow him to enter the city. Upon his return to Switzerland he found letters from his brother, in which the latter, with great candor and kindness, admitted that he would rather Holland should return to the government of the prince

*Paris, 16 Janvier, 1813.*

\* Mon frère, je reçois votre lettre du premier Janvier et je vois avec plaisir les sentimens qui vous animent ; je vous ai déjà fait connaître que vos devoirs envers moi, la patrie et vos enfans, exigeaient votre retour en France. Vos enfans grandissent et ont besoin de leur père. Revenez donc sans plus de retard, et je vous recevrai, non comme un frère que vous avez offensé, mais comme un frère qui vous a élevé. Quant aux idées que vous avez de la situation de mes affaires elles sont fausses ; j’ai un million d’hommes sur pied, et deux cents millions dans mes coffres, pour maintenir l’intégrité du territoire de la confédération et de celui de mes alliés, et faire réussir le projet que j’ai conçu pour le bonheur de mes peuples. *La Hollande est Française à jamais ; elle est l’émanation de notre territoire* ; embouchure de nos rivières elle ne peut être heureuse qu’avec la France, et elle le sent bien. En restant en France, vous ne vous séparez pas de la Hollande ; mais si vous entendez par vous en séparer, renoncer à la gouverner, c’est vous même qui l’avez quittée en abdiquant, etc. etc.

of Orange, than to that of Louis. The following extract contains the narration of his journey to Paris.

‘After the battle of Leipsic, the king of Naples came to Switzerland and proceeded to Basle, where his brother-in-law [Louis] was, and they had an interview. The king of Naples had returned to endeavour to preserve himself, in the event of the existence of the French government’s being menaced. He advised his brother-in-law to return to Holland with the assistance of the allies. The latter replied, that he never could do it; for it would not be permitted to Holland to remain entirely neutral, and for no throne in the world would he make war on his own country. “If France is successful,” said he, “what reproaches should I not merit for having drawn its vengeance on the kingdom? if she is unsuccessful, the allies, in the end, would certainly give the preference to the prince of Orange.”’

‘However, after the departure of the king of Naples, Louis reflected maturely on the singular situation in which he found himself. He saw very well, that it was a favourable moment to endeavour to reenter Holland, that it was advantageous for the French government to renounce a country which was about to escape from her, and to establish in it a French dynasty. He sent an officer of his guard to Mayence, with orders to wait there for the Emperor, and give him a letter, in which he endeavoured to persuade his brother not to lose the opportunity of pursuing the only course, which remained to France at this moment.

‘As he could not doubt that Napoleon would willingly cede to him a country which was about to fall into the hands of the allies, and as it was of urgent necessity not to lose time, he resolved to repair directly to Amsterdam, if the French Government consented, and would permit the Hollanders at Paris to follow him. He advanced towards that capital, after having written to the Empress Regent and to the Prince Cambacérés. But he was very much astonished, on arriving at Pont sur Seine, to learn that they refused to receive him at Paris. He returned then to Switzerland, where he found the answer of the Emperor, by letters from Prince Berthier and the duc de Vicence, and from the speech of the Emperor to the officer who had been sent to him. These answers were exactly conformable to each other. “*I should prefer that Holland should return to the power of the prince of Orange, than to that of my brother,*” said the Emperor; “if he has a hundred thousand men to oppose to me, he may attempt to take it from me,” &c.

Louis also made a direct address to the magistrates of Amsterdam, which seems to have been intended as an invi-

tation to them to call him to the chief magistracy. Although this document is of some length, we venture to insert it.

‘*Soleure, November 29, 1813.*

‘ TO THE MAGISTRATES OF AMSTERDAM.

‘Gentlemen, the new circumstances, in which Holland is placed, oblige me to return from my retirement; they will either complete the obligations which have attached me to your country for eight years, or free me from them entirely.

‘It is, then, to understand the sentiments of the nation with respect to myself, sentiments which shall guide my final conduct, that I address myself to you, not only as to the capital of the United Provinces, but as to their natural representatives, since there is no other general representation of the country.

‘When Providence permitted that I should mount the throne of your country, without having sought or desired this honor, I did not decide upon it except upon the following considerations.

‘1. That the last Stadtholder had died without ever resigning the *stadtholderat*, or accepting any indemnity or compensation.

‘2. That his son, the hereditary prince, on the contrary, had formally renounced, and received the principality of Fulda in return.

‘3. That the princes of this illustrious house, to which your country owes so many obligations, were not at this time the sovereigns of Holland.

4. In fine, I thought that relations of friendship, and of conformity of interests with France, would contribute more than any thing else to establish a state of peace and neutrality, the first base and object of the policy of your country.

‘After my arrival, I discovered very soon that to act conscientiously, it was necessary to act as the prince of an independent nation, created to be its defender and its first magistrate, and to forget entirely that accident had had the greatest share in my elevation. This I attempted to do. If the nation suffered under my reign, it would have suffered incomparably more without it. Its situation since 1810, that of Poland, Saxony, and Hamburgh prove this sufficiently.

‘The years 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, and 1810 were the most painful which can be found in the history of the interior administration of any country. When it was thought that Holland could not sustain for three months the enormous weight of its finances, which was constantly rendered more onerous by the state of its foreign relations, she resisted five years a blockade by sea and land, forced armaments, restraints and snares, obstacles of all sorts for a man entirely a stranger till then to your country, and

entirely isolated among the snares of the policy which ought to have been his guide and support, and those of the enemies of the new order of things in Holland, and the enemies of France. I made every effort possible for man. I alone know what I have done for Holland in silence and solitude. I struggled without ceasing and with perseverance, consenting to inevitable innovations with the utmost possible delay, and endeavouring to accelerate the epoch of a general peace or of a genuine independence. My object was on the arrival of this event, to consult the nation, freely assembled, and to do, without exception, whatever it should judge necessary, and for its interest.

‘When, in consequence of the descent of the English at Walcheren, I was obliged to repair to Paris, as at the epoch of my abdication, my object was to resist violence, all powerful as it was, but divested of every other argument; to dispute inch by inch the approach of the catastrophe of Holland with him who had conquered all the great powers of Europe; to preserve inviolate the rights of the country, in spite of the plots and the opinions of Hollanders, secretly perverted, and, when it was necessary to yield, to abdicate *only to my children*, not to hesitate to sacrifice my personal interests to the preservation of the rights and the hopes of the country, continued by my abdication and the elevation of a minor to the throne, whom the constitution would place under the guarantee, and almost the regency of France, of whom the incapacity for thirteen years would take away even the smallest pretext against Holland, and to relieve her thus from the power of a king, whom France appeared to have chosen by her influence, merely to act as the unwilling instrument of union.

‘If adopting, as I had almost done, another course of conduct, I had remained at Amsterdam, merely a machine, or even if we had been in a state to make war, the fate of Holland would have been that of Poland, Saxony, and Hamburg. You would not have been able, as you are now, to claim of all your powerful neighbours perfect neutrality and independence, and avoid the inevitable consequences of hostility. I could not be so useful to your country as the house of Orange; any other Dutch prince under the same protection would have been, to say the least, useless, even if I had allowed myself to be involved in a defence which would have served but for the plausible pretext of conquest. I ought not and I could not be useful to you, but in retaining myself independent of France, but never its enemy.

‘Since my abdication, then, I have remained at Gratz in Austria; and after three years’ residence in that city, I came to live in the Swiss cantons: 1. not to place myself in a state of war with France: 2. to be more ready to be of assistance to Holland, should circumstances permit.

‘Already in 1812, after the retreat from Russia, I made at Gratz all the efforts in my power for the liberty of Holland ; they were fruitless in spite of all my care.

‘After my arrival in Switzerland three months had hardly elapsed when I learned, the 27 of last October at Basle, the retreat of the French armies on the Rhine, and the evacuation of Germany, and I anticipated that Holland would either *rise*, or be occupied by the allies.

‘Faithful to my opinion, which experience has too well confirmed, I wished to profit by the only opportunity offered of establishing a counterpoise in Germany, and of the approaching evacuation of Holland, to place that country in a state of real independence and strict neutrality, the only state which is proper for Holland, without which it will be ruined sooner or later ; an object equally at heart with all the belligerent powers. I sent to Mayence to the Emperor of the French, and to the Empress Regent at Paris ; I demanded with the evacuation of Holland my free passage across France. If this had taken place, sure from my journey through France of her not being inimical, and of her consent, tacit but certain, I would have convoked the nation on my arrival, I would have told you my opinion, and you should have done what you judged most proper, in regard to your political situation, and that of your constitution ; ready to retire, had you preferred the house of Orange to me, but not before I had fulfilled my last duty to you.

‘I arrived the third of November at Pont-sur-Seine, near Paris, where I received very unfavourable answers to some of my requests, and none to the most essential. I learnt there that it was not decided to evacuate Holland ; I returned to my retreat in Switzerland, where at length I received an indirect answer at Mayence, more than negative.

‘In this situation I wrote to M. de Byland Hatt, one of the last presidents of the legislative body ; to Messieurs Roell and Krajenhoff, former ministers ; to William Willink, counsellor of state ; and Professor Van Lennep, whose intelligence, and patriotism, and character are known to me. I do not know if these letters have arrived, but as I send duplicates of them with this letter, you will be able to understand their contents. My object, as you will see, is to have my conduct and sentiments known in Holland. Since, I have learned all that has passed, and in this state of things I have considered that since three years and a half, I have been isolated, wandering in strange places ; that I have renounced my native country wholly and absolutely, to remain faithful to the system which I have thought would be most useful to your country ; that if my adopted country for eight years escapes me, I shall find myself without country, without friend, without any bond ; that in the meantime, in the important circumstances of

Europe, every thing presses me to take some step, no longer to remain the plaything of events, to become entirely free in my actions, and to finish the fulfilment of every duty I owe your land.

‘In addressing myself to you, gentlemen, in regarding you as the representatives of a nation without a general representation, and demanding its decision, I believe myself discharging this last duty. Whatever this decision may be, I pray you to let me know it as soon as possible.

‘I finish this manifesto, so important to myself, by a sincere wish for the happiness of Holland, and by the requests I make her in this connexion :

‘1. Not to confine herself to the old constitution, but to finish that which the act of union of Utrecht only sketched, in a word, to constitute a free but monarchical government, like England and Switzerland ; without this the state of Holland will be precarious and depend on various causes, extraneous to herself.

‘2. Not to let herself be carried away by animosities or exaggerations ; to consider that the state of peace and neutrality is the only safeguard of the country ; that the armaments should be as strong as possible at present, merely to maintain the independence of the ancient territory, and the absence from it of foreign troops, and to avoid carefully becoming the theatre of the war. Whatever may be your answer, I shall remain unalterably and tenderly attached to your country.’

As the Dutch, without paying any attention to this letter, conferred the sovereign power upon the Prince of Orange, Louis considered himself as disengaged from all his obligations towards his former subjects. It is impossible not to perceive from this proceeding, as well as from the other instances of the same kind which we have pointed out, that Louis, with very good intentions, and with no small share of magnanimity and disinterestedness in his character, misconceived entirely his position in regard to Holland. He appears to have considered his nomination by Napoleon to the crown of that country, as conferring upon him a right to the government of it ; and to have thought that his conduct while there had gained him the good will of his subjects. Nothing, of course, can be clearer, than that his appointment conferred no right whatever, and it is quite evident that the nation only considered him as the instrument of a foreign oppressor, fortunately less pliant to his employer’s wishes than the rest, but still connected effectively with a system, which they had every reason to detest.

Being now disengaged from his obligations to his former subjects, Louis determined to return to France, and to live there as a private citizen. He arrived at Paris the first of January 1814. The Emperor at first refused to see him, and even exiled him forty leagues from the city, but by the intervention of their brother they were induced to have a meeting, which passed very coldly. He remained at or near Paris till the return of the Bourbons, but does not appear to have been on friendly terms with his brother. He remarks, however, that at this period he wrote to Napoleon almost every day, for the purpose of pressing him to agree to terms. It required indeed no uncommon sagacity to see that Napoleon was playing at this time a desperate game, but the same extravagant spirit, which made him lose the opportunities which presented themselves the year before of concluding a most advantageous peace on moderate terms, now urged him on to complete ruin. After the abdication, Louis repaired to Rome, having first obtained the Pope's permission; and has continued to reside there ever since. He had the discretion and good fortune not to take any part in the disastrous movement of the year 1815. We add here the passage, in which he speaks of his last interview with Napoleon.

‘He then quitted Switzerland, proceeded to Lyons, and arrived at Paris the morning of the first of January. He alighted at his mother's abode. He could not see the Emperor, till ten days after his arrival. An order was intimated to him to depart 40 leagues from Paris. The Prince de Neufchatel and the Duc de Vicence came to announce this order formally to him, which he refused to obey, because no one had the right of forbidding him to live at home.

‘He saw the Emperor at last the tenth of January, by the mediation of the Empress; they met coldly without embracing. It would be difficult to describe the feelings of Louis at meeting a brother to whom his childhood had been so much indebted, but who had given such cause of complaint after his life and prospects had been sacrificed to policy and the illusions of the world. He begged his brother to pass by every thing which could concern Holland in their conversation; he promised himself to forget this country entirely during his stay in France. “If victory places it in your power,” said he, “I only claim the permission to leave France, when I do not wish to stay, if France invades that kingdom a second time; if, on the contrary, victory abandons you, there will be no farther question, nor necessity of discussion.”’

‘This is the letter of the Emperor, written with his own hand, which Louis refused to obey.\*

“My brother, I have received your two letters, and learnt with regret that you have arrived at Paris without my permission. You are no longer king of Holland, since you have abdicated, and since I have united that country to France; you ought to think no more of it. The territory of the empire is invaded, and I have all Europe armed against me. Will you come as a French prince, as constable of the empire, and place yourself near the throne? I will receive you; you will be my subject; in that quality you shall enjoy my friendship, and do what you can for the common cause. If on the contrary you persist in your ideas of king and Holland, retire 40 leagues from Paris. I do not wish any ambiguous character, any *rôle tiers*. If you accept, write me a letter, that I can have printed.”

‘He staid at Paris during the months of January, February, and March, to the thirtieth of this last month, when he followed the Empress to Blois. He insisted that she should remain at Paris, in spite of the entry of the allies, but she dared not. The Emperor, in his instructions, declared traitors all, who should remain at Paris, provided this city should be occupied by the allies, and even any one who should advise the Empress to remain.

‘He saw the Emperor a second time the thirtieth of January, on the eve of his departure to the army. The Emperor was decided to make peace after the first victory, but suffered himself to be drawn into a contrary system. That one of his brothers, of whom we speak here, did not cease to press him to sign any peace, he wrote to him almost every day, and among others the 3, 5, and 16 March; in the last of his letters he wrote these remarkable words: “If your majesty does not sign the peace, be convinced your government has not much more than three weeks of existence; it only requires a little coolness and good sense to judge of the state of things at this moment.” It was the 16 of March that he wrote these prophetic words, and the 18 of April that the revolution took place. But Fortune is never more deceptive, than when she commences extraordinary prosperity; every thing succeeds to the wishes of her favourites; the sails are swelled, the sea and elements favourable and agreeable to their wish; but let them wait the end of their course, and learn that the evil is in proportion to the good; that time lost by misfortune she makes up, and that every thing is balanced in this world and in the next.’

‘\* Mon frère, j’ai reçu vos deux lettres, et j’ai appris avec peine que vous soyez arrivé à Paris sans ma permission. Vous n’êtes plus roi de Hollande depuis que vous avez renoncé, et que j’ai réuni ce pays à la France; vous ne devez plus y songer. Le territoire de l’empire est enva-



We should do injustice to the character of the Dutch if we omitted to notice the very lofty and flattering eulogium which is passed upon it in this work, by one who certainly possessed some means of judging it with correctness.

‘To consider the humid, uncultivated, and desert aspect of the greatest part of the low, inundated, and as it were artificial soil of a coast, eaten away on the one side by the principal rivers of Europe, which empty themselves over it, and on the other constantly menaced by the tempestuous and violent waves on these shores ; to consider the prodigious labour of the Dutch, necessary to preserve their soil above the waters ; to consider the continual necessity they are under of the most unrelaxing activity and industry, to procure their subsistence on a barren, expensive, and trembling soil, in an unfavourable climate, one would not think this people could love their country. One would lament their being no more favoured by heaven, and be ready to compare them to a company of exiles, banished from other societies, and forced to live on a thankless and unhealthy soil. But when the manners and character of this people are examined nearer, it is easy to discern their virtues, their candor, their good sense, their attachment to their duty, their patience, their love of labour, their moderation in pleasure, their gratitude and their love towards the Author of every good ; when we observe their aptitude for every thing they undertake ; the great men they have produced ; the perfect state of their agriculture, sciences, commerce, and arts ; the high degree of intelligence and civilization they possess, we might compare this people to a *community of philosophers*, disgusted with the reverses, follies, and evils of other men ; and who, desirous of living apart, according to their reason and their conscience, look with pity on the pomp, the pleasures, the grandeur, the luxury, the frivolity, and the inhumanity of the world ; or rather we might compare them to a chosen people, set apart by heaven as a model for other nations.’

Our readers are perhaps aware that the Netherlands are regarded by some inquirers, principally, we believe, inhabitants of the country, as the original seat of civilization and science, as the primitive root from which proceed the various

hi, et j'ai toute l'Europe armée contre moi. Voulez-vous venir comme prince français, comme connétable de l'empire, vous ranger auprès du trône ? Je vous recevrai, vous serez mon sujet ; en cette qualité, vous y jouirez de mon amitié, et ferez ce que vous pourrez pour le bien des affaires. Il faut alors que vous ayez pour moi, pour le roi de Rome, pour l'Imperatrice, ce que vous devez avoir [?] Si au contraire, vous persistez dans vos idées de roi et de Hollandais, éloignez-vous de quarante lieues de Paris. Je ne veux pas de position mixte, de rôle tiers. Si vous accédez, écrivez moi une lettre que je puisse faire imprimer.’

branches of the tree of knowledge which now flourish in the East and in the West. They even consider the geography of these provinces as the ground work of the seducing narratives we read in ancient poets and romances of the Fortunate islands, the Elysian fields, the Sunken land of Atlas and the country of the Hyperboreans, all which places are universally described by the writers in question, as inhabited by an uncommonly virtuous race of men, *gens justissima*—a nation of heroes and sages. The advocates of this theory are accustomed to urge, among other corroborating circumstances, the great conformity between the actual character of the Dutch and the qualities attributed in history to the tribes in question. In fact, if the Dutch are, as they suppose by general acknowledgment, *a community of philosophers*, the theory would certainly be in a high degree probable. Such communities are not of daily occurrence, and with the exception of the United States, we have no people who can put in a very plausible claim to this distinction. The opinion of Louis, which we quoted above, forms, therefore, a singular corroboration of this system, and the more as it appears to have been given without any view to its being used for this purpose. If the attempts which have been made to substantiate the analogy between the arts and languages of the different nations of the world, and those of Holland are equally successful, we may regard the solution of this most interesting problem in the history of man, as near at hand. We have not room, at the close of this long article, to enter upon a full discussion of a new subject of such importance, but must reserve our remarks for a future essay, which we have in preparation, on the local position of the garden of Eden. We may add, however, that the opinion of the late worthy and ingenious Diedrich Knickerbocker, respecting the Dutch character, appears to have been not less elevated than that of Louis Bonaparte.

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ART. XIV.—*Anastasius ; or Memoirs of a Greek : written at the close of the last century.* New York, reprinted, 2 vols. 12mo. 1820.

THERE are few things, in which the progress of taste has been greater, than in the department of novel writing. A